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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

OCTOBER TERM, 1963.

No. 1047

MILLER AND COMPANY OF BIRMINGHAM, INC.,
Petitioner,

vs.

LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

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To the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Petitioner prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, entered in the above entitled case on January 31, 1964.

OPINIONS BELOW.

The judgment of the District Court (R. 29-31), entering judgment on the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the subsequent overruling of the defendant's Motion For a New Trial and, in the alternative, to amend

the judgment, are unreported. The opinion of the Court of Appeals (R. 37), reported at 328 Fed. 2d 73, is set out in the appendix to this Petition.

JURISDICTION.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on January 31, 1964 (R. 50). Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C., Sec. 2514(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

(I)

Can a common carrier contract with another in Alabama to secure indemnity from its own negligence or does this violate public policy?

(II)

Can a carrier, operating under a public franchise in Alabama, contract with another to secure indemnity for its own negligence and not contravene the public policy of said State?

(III)

Can the Court of Appeals construe the public policy of a sovereign State in direct disregard of the settled law and statutes of such State?

STATUTES INVOLVED.

The determination of the status of respondent at the time the contract herein was executed, i. e., whether it was acting as a common carrier or in a private capacity, involves the construction of Article 12, Sec. 242 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 and Title 48, Code of Alabama 1940, Sections 170, 173 and 205 as recompiled.

The aforementioned sections and statutes are contained in the appendix hereto.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This case is an action for declaratory judgment in which the jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked on the basis of the amount in controversy being in excess of $10,000 and diversity of citizenship, plaintiff being a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Kentucky, with its principal place of business in said State, and the defendant a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, in which State it has its principal place of business.

The purpose of the declaratory judgment proceeding was to construe the indemnity provisions of a spur track agreement between the parties herein. An employee of the petitioner (lumber company) filed suit against the respondent (railroad) charging that it negligently operated railroad cars at the premises of the petitioner so as to cause them to collide with a lumber rack and force it into a wooden shed which collapsed and injured the employee.

The respondent (railroad), upon being sued, made demand upon the petitioner to defend the action and pay any loss sustained by the railroad on the basis of the indemnity agreement.

The case was submitted upon an agreed stipulation of facts, following which the District Court, and subsequently the Court of Appeals, concluded that wording of the indemnity agreement reflected a purpose to indemnify the railroad against the consequences of its own negligence. The petitioner's assertion that the public policy of the State of Alabama does not permit such construction was rejected by the Court of Appeals on the theory that "**the stipulated facts do not connect the railroad's negligence with its duties as a common carrier**". The Court of Appeals refused to respect the provisions of Title 48, Code

of Alabama, Sec. 205 as recompiled, requiring railroads to construct spur tracks on the basis that the Alabama Public Service Commission had adopted no general rules to implement the Statute. It ignores the fact that under the Alabama Constitution a railroad company is a common carrier.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.

The decision of the Court of Appeals involves a substantial and vital question of public policy frequently presented to the Federal and State Courts of this Nation and the holding therein is in conflict not only with the statutes and settled law of the State of the Forum, but also the prior decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, itself.

The increasing prosperity of our nation, tempered by the bitter lessons of the depression and subsequent regressions has given rise to a need for security, both in business and our personal affairs. The old "all or nothing" gambling approach seen so much in the past has been replaced by the sound business practice of obtaining a cushion against a loss that could mean financial ruin. Insurance Companies have capitalized on this need for security to the point that the insurance industry is growing by "leaps and bounds". However, many of our contemporaries are not content to pay the premium for their security and **"indemnity against one's own negligence contracts"** are becoming more and more prevalent.

Generally speaking, these contracts arise out of a situation where one of the parties is in a commanding bargaining position and, as such, is able to thrust its terms upon the party in the inferior position. The injustice perpetrated by these agreements is apparent; even when the contracting parties stand on equal footing under the

law, but where one of the parties derives its superior advantage from a monopoly granted by a public franchise, it becomes a serious and vital matter of public policy. This Court recognized the critical nature of these questions in **Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 75 S. Ct. 629, 349 U. S. 85, 99 Law Ed. 991.** In the opinion written by Mr. J. Black, we find the Court tracing the judicial travels of "release-from-liability" clauses in towage contracts commencing in 1871 with **The Steamer Syracuse, 12 Wall. 167, 20 L. Ed. 382,** to intercircuit conflict terminating in **The Wash Gray, 277 U S. 66, 48 S. Ct. 459, 72 L. Ed. 787,** and observing:

"It is nevertheless argued that The Steamer Syracuse and The Wash Gray did not announce a rule of public policy against release-from-negligence contracts, but decided no more than what the towage contracts in those cases meant. Strong arguments can be made in support of this contention, but we think stronger argument can be made against it. * * * **The Steamer Syracuse, The Wash Gray and intervening lower court cases together strongly point to the existence of a judicial rule, based on public policy, invalidating contracts releasing Towers from all liability for their negligence. Because of this judicial history and cogent reasons in support of a rule outlawing such contracts, we now, despite past uncertainty and difference among the circuits, accept this as the controlling rule.**

This rule is merely a particular application to the towage business of a general rule long used by courts and legislatures to prevent enforcement of release-from-negligence contracts in many relationships, such as bailors and bailees, employers and employees, public service companies and their customers. **The two main reasons for the creation and application of the**

rule have been (1) to discourage negligence by making wrongdoers pay damages, and (2) to protect those in need of goods or services from being overreached by others who have power to drive hard bargains. These two reasons are no less applicable today than when The Steamer Syracuse and The Wash Gray were decided, and both reasons apply with equal force whether the tugs operate as common carriers or contract carriers. The dangers of modern machines makes it all the more necessary that negligence be discouraged."

In a concurring opinion in **Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corporation,** Mr. J. Douglas pointed out:

> "Common carriers may not **'by any form of agreement secure exemption from liability for loss or damage caused by their own negligence.'** Sun Oil Company v. Dalzell Towing Co., supra, 287 U. S. 294, 53 S. Ct. 136. See New York Central Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 21 L. Ed. 627; Liverpool & Great Western Steam Company v. Phoenix Insurance Company, 129 U. S. 397, 9 S. Ct. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788. The reasons are as germane to a tug boat that is a contract carrier as they are to a tug boat that is a common carrier. They are well stated by Judge Coxe, dissenting in The Oceanica, 2 Cir., 170 Fed. 893, 896:
>
> > **'It ought to be against public policy to permit a vessel to contract against her own fault. To allow her to do so begets recklessness, carelessness and neglect.** * * *'"

This Court has most recently reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of **Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. The Crescent Towing & Salvage Company, 83 S. Ct. 967,** holding that the rule of Bisso prevails to prohibit a barge-

owner from assuming liability for all losses arising out of towage, including those caused by the towers' negligence. This case not only establishes the rule for the Fifth Circuit in cases of this nature, but the decision also points out another consideration which would demand that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reviewed. This is found in the concurring opinion of Mr. J. Harlan in which he states:

> "While I would prefer to see Bisso reconsidered, believing, with deference, that it was wrongly decided, I nevertheless join the opinion of the Court. **Certainly in the law governing commercial transactions of this kind is an overriding consideration which would not be promoted by opening the Bisso rule to indeterminate exceptions** in instances where, unlike Southwestern Sugar, no functions of a regulatory agency are involved."

The need for "**certainty in the law governing commercial transactions of this kind**" is a compelling reason to merit review by this Court of the Court of Appeals' decision in which they have, as in the Dixilyn case, attempted to water down the rule of the Bisso case by applying an untenable distinction as will hereinafter be demonstrated.

The rule established by this Court for the Fifth Circuit in the Dixilyn case does not deviate from previous decisions of that Court. In **Chicago & Northwestern RR Co. v. Davenport, 205 Fed. 2d 589,** the Fifth Circuit had occasion to review a case in which a railroad employee sustained injuries when an insecurely attached grab-iron, located on the roof of one of the cars, came loose, causing him to fall. At the time of the employee's injury the railroad was engaged in hauling a circus. The Court held that the railroad had acted as a common carrier in the transportation of circus train and it was, therefore, not entitled

to indemnity against damages paid for its negligence. In its opinion, the Court held:

> "Appellant railroad relies upon the principle that, when a railroad company is acting outside the performance of its duty as a common carrier, * * * it is dealing with matters involving ordinary consideration on contractual relation; those who choose to enter into agreement with it are not at a disadvantage; and its stipulations even against liability for its own neglect are not repugnant to the requirements of its public service."
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> * * * * * * * *
>
> The present case presents the situation envisioned by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Bernardi Greater Shows v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 86 N. H. 146, 165 A. 124, 131, where it is said that: '* * * If a case were presented in which it appeared that a railroad had entered this field as a common carrier, the federal decisions above mentioned would no longer be in point, and the case would be governed by the rule, which is equally well settled in the Federal Courts, that a common carrier acting as such cannot, by contract, relieve itself from liability for the negligence of itself or its servants.'"

We advert now to the law of the State of the Forum which, under the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins, is controlling in this case. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in **Gulf, M. & O. R. Co. v. Scott, 27 Sou. 2d 150**, had occasion to pass on an indemnity agreement described by the Court as follows:

> "It was further provided under said agreement that the railroad company would not be liable to Scott for any damages on account of the killing or injuring of live stock straying through or escaping from the enclosure made by said fence for the life thereof, which

was agreed to be 15 years from the date of its execution, **whether caused by the negligence of the railroad company, or otherwise.**"

The plaintiff who had brought action against the railroad to recover damages for killing his bull, demurred to pleas setting up the Indemnity Agreement on the ground that it was void and against public policy. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court in sustaining the demurrers on that basis.

In **Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company v. Thomas & Sons**, supra, the claim was also by a person who had contracted directly with the railroad, with our Supreme Court taking this view of the same:

> "The attempt of the defendant railroad company, as shown in the contract of affreightment, to relieve itself or liability, 'except for gross or wanton negligence', and also its attempt to reduce its responsibility in the manner of delivering to the connecting road to that of a mere agent of the consignor, are opposed to public policy and cannot be allowed. Steele v. Townsend, 37 Sls. 247, etc."

See also **Hissong v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 91 Ala. 517, 8 So. 776.**

The above cited Alabama cases have never been overruled and, therefore, state the applicable Alabama law which is in substantial conformity with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States heretofore cited.

The gravamen of the complaint against the respondent (railroad) for which it seeks indemnity against the petitioner (lumber company) is that it breached a statutory duty to the plaintiff in failing to stop the movement of the railroad cars which it was controlling in time to avoid

the same striking the lumber rack in the immediate vicinity of the track and pushing it into the wooden shed located in close proximity, by which acts plaintiff avers the same was caused to collapse upon him, resulting in his injuries. Title 48, Sec. 170, of the Code of Alabama, 1940, as recompiled, provides in part:

> "The engineer, or other person having control of the running of a locomotive on any railroad, must * * * on perceiving any obstruction on the track, use all the means within his power, known to skillful engineers, such as applying brakes and reversing engine, in order to stop the train."

Sec. 173, Title 48, Code of Alabama, 1940, as recompiled, provides in substance that a railroad is prima facie liable for all damage to persons or property resulting from a failure to comply with the requirements of certain statutes, including the provision hereinbefore set out, and the burden of proof in any suit brought therefor is on the railroad company to show a compliance with the same and that there was no negligence on its part or its agents. These sections evidence the intention of the Legislature of Alabama to regulate and control the operation of railroads in this State and the plaintiff, Will Jackson, in his action against the respondent (railroad) is entitled to the benefits of these statutes.

It is small wonder that Alabama holds that it is in contravention of public policy for a common carrier to escape the obligations of its common law and statutory duty by contracting against its own negligence. Indeed, under the law of Alabama, if the decision of Fifth Circuit should prevail, it would require that the party contracting with the railroad would assume the burden of the high degree of care required of railroads. They would be required to indemnify the railroad for acts not amounting to negligence under the common law.

The end result here is that the petitioner is called upon to indemnify the railroad for a liability it assumes as a common carrier under our statutes. Petitioner submits that the indemnity agreement herein has been construed by the Court of Appeals to be valid if the contract of indemnity was entered into only in its private capacity. **However, the case in which indemnity is sought involved the railroad's duties as a common carrier.** Whatever its capacity at the time of the contractual undertaking herein, the respondent is seeking indemnity for its own negligence as a common carrier.

The Court of Appeals, showing the same reluctance to recognize the rule that a common carrier may not contract against its own negligence, as it did in the Dixilyn case, has held the doctrine inapplicable on the basis that the (railroad) was not acting in its capacity as a common carrier. **The Court, however, citing Article 242 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, took judicial knowledge of the fact that the respondent was a common carrier.** This section of our Constitution provides, in part: "All railroads and canals not constructed or used exclusively for private purposes, shall be public highways, and **all railroad and canal companies shall be common carriers.**" By virtue of the fact that the respondent is a railroad, it is a common carrier, as a matter of law. **There is no provision or distinction in Alabama law allowing a railroad company to operate in any other capacity.**

The Fifth Circuit has held here that the respondent was not acting in its capacity as a common carrier in contracting to construct the spur track forming the basis for the indemnity agreement herein. In doing this, the Court not only has overlooked the clear and unequivocal language of the above quoted constitutional provision, but also has completely denied the validity of Title 48, Code of Alabama, 1940, Sec. 205, as recompiled, which provides:

"Spur and side tracks provided for.—**Every railroad is required to construct and maintain spur tracks and side tracks to industries already established under such reasonable rules and orders as may be made by the Commission.**"

Disdaining the aforementioned Statute, the Court of Appeals chooses to rely instead upon a statement of dubious universality from 175 A. L. R. at page 102 to the effect that "the service afforded the shipper by additional facilities (such as spur tracks to his plant) for the special handling of his freight is not required of the railroad under its duties to the public as a carrier, so that it may attach such conditions as it sees fit in giving its consent to furnish the particular service, including a provision for exemption from liability for loss through its own negligence." Since it cannot be disputed that the Petitioner is a member of the public, the foregoing assertion by the annotater in 175 A. L. R. is far from true in Alabama where, by Statute, common carriers are compelled to construct side tracks to service existing industries along the railroads right of way, subject only to reasonable rules made by the Public Service Commission and **not** the dictates of their own choosing.

The Court of Appeals reasons that "it makes no difference that an Alabama Statute may impose a duty on the railroad to construct and maintain spur tracks to existing industries. The Alabama Public Service Commission has adopted no general rules to implement that Statute, nor has it prohibited the kind of indemnity contract here agreed on." This distinction is untenable and violative of the public policy of the State of the Forum. It has wrongfully misplaced the burden of proof on the petitioner to negative the existence of any rules promulgated by the Public Service Commission which could not alter the mandate of the Statute but only its administration. It is certainly not within the power of the Public Service Com-

mission to pass on the public policy of the State of Alabama and prohibit indemnity contracts of this nature, especially in view of the many decisions of the Supreme Court of Alabama on this point. We furthermore submit that the Statute does not require the implementation of rules by the Public Service Commission as a condition of its validity. By its decision, the Court of Appeals has emasculated Sec. 205, supra, due to the failure of the Public Service Commission to exercise a doubtful authority by adopting general rules to implement the Statute.

In addition to the fallacious position of the Court of Appeals with regard to its construction of the Alabama Statute, that court has completely overlooked the basic principles giving rise to the doctrine that a common carrier may not contract against its own negligence. The rule has been applied (1) to prohibit a contract that would beget recklessness and negligence, and (2) to protect the members of the public in need of goods or services from being exploited by those who derive their power from a public monopoly. It is this latter consideration that is of concern in this case.

The respondent operates in juxta-position to the plant of the petitioner under Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, and in the enjoyment of its franchise, it has a monopoly insofar as supplying transportation services to industries located on its line. Whatever agreements or contracts shippers along the line must make, they are compelled to deal with the respondent by virtue of the fact that it operates its line under its franchise to the exclusion of all others. The Legislature of the State of Alabama has sought to protect the petitioner and those in similar positions by requiring railroads to construct and maintain spur tracks to industries already established. To allow a construction that the railroad can reap the benefits of its public franchise by extorting one

sided contracts of indemnity against its own negligence as a condition to constructing the spur tracks would be violative of the very basic tenets of the doctrine of the Bisso case would hold for naught decisions of the Law of the Forum. We submit that such a decision as sanctioned by the Court of Appeals should not survive as a precedent on this very serious and vital question.

CONCLUSION.

We submit that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in direct conflict with the settled law of the State of the Forum and of the Supreme Court of the United States, is contrary to Alabama public policy and therefore should not be allowed to stand in view of the vital nature of the question presented and the over-riding importance of obtaining certainty in commercial transactions. For these reasons the writ is due to be issued.

Respectfully submitted,

James E. Clark

JAMES E. CLARK,
Counsel for Petitioner.

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing petition for writ of certiorari has been served upon Messrs. Lange, Simpson, Robinson and Somerville, attention Mr. Henry Simpson, Exchange Security Bank Building, Birmingham 3, Alabama, attorneys of record for Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company.

This 24 day of April, 1964.

James E. Clark

Counsel for Petitioner.

APPENDIX "A".

Opinion of the Court Below, 328 Fed. 2d 73.

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit.

No. 20,355.

Miller and Company of Birmingham, Inc.,
Appellant,

versus

Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company,
Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

(January 31, 1964)

Before Rives and Wisdom,* Circuit Judges.

Rives, Circuit Judge: In a declaratory judgment action, the district court construed the indemnity provisions of a spur-track agreement between the railroad and the industry[1] in favor of the railroad. The case was tried on stipulated facts. Paragraphs (12) and (14) of the con-

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* The third Judge constituting the Court became ill before argument was heard, and the case is decided by a quorum. 28 U. S. C. A. § 46 (c).

[1] The parties will be so called.

tract between the railroad (first party) and the industry (second party) read as follows:

"(12) Second party agrees that it will not construct any overhead structure lower than 22 feet above the top of the rail of said track, or any structure within eight feet from center line of said track, and that it will not place or permit any structures or obstructions, of either a permanent or temporary nature, on said track, or within the limits of the horizontal and vertical clearances above provided; and further agrees that it will indemnify and save harmless the first party against and from any and all claims for loss of or damage to property or injury to person caused directly or indirectly by the existence, location or condition of any structures or obstructions of any kind on the premises of second party, or by any structures or obstructions, of either a permanent or temporary nature, on said track, or within the limits of the clearances above provided. Knowledge of or notice to the first party of the existence, location or condition of any structures or obstructions of any kind on the premises of the second party, and its continued operation of the track thereafter, shall not be a waiver of this covenant.

"(14) The second party also agrees to indemnify and hold harmless first party against loss, damage, or injury from any act or omission of second party, its employees, or agents, to the person or property of the parties hereto and their employees, and to the person or property of any other person or corporation, while on or about said track; and if any claim or liability shall arise from the joint or concurring act or omission of both parties hereto, their employees or agents, each party shall assume all liability for and indemnify the other party against loss, damage or injury to its

own employees and to its own property and the property of others in its care or custody, and liability for loss, damage or injury not herein provided for shall be borne by the parties equally. Provided, that nothing in this section contained is intended to or shall relieve second party of the obligations of release and indemnity contained in Sections 11 and 12."

The contract was drawn by the railroad, and executed by both the railroad and the industry. The railroad built the spur track in consideration, among other things, of the industry executing the contract.

An employee of the industry filed suit against the railroad charging that it negligently operated railroad cars at the premises of the industry so as to cause them to collide with a lumber rack and force it into a wooden shed which collapsed on and injured the employee. The wooden shed was six feet, at its closest point, from the center line of the spur track. The shed was constructed by the industry more than two years prior to the accident, and the railroad had knowledge of its location and of its proximity to the spur track. The lumber rack was on the premises of the industry, and had been placed in the immediate vicinity of the spur track by employees of the industry other than the injured employee. The outermost portion of the railroad car alleged in the employee's complaint to have come into contact with the lumber rack was four feet and eight inches from the center of the spur track.

The railroad, upon being sued, made demand upon the industry to defend the action and to pay any loss which might be sustained by the railroad. The industry declined and the railroad then filed this declaratory judgment action praying that the court declare whether, under the provisions of the contract, the industry is obligated to defend the action and to hold the railroad harmless. By its an-

swer the industry joined with the railroad in seeking an adjudication of the controversy. The district court said in its conclusions of law:

". . . . Absent conduct on its part as, for example, its sole negligence producing the injury to Jackson, Batson-Cook Co. v. Industrial Steel Erectors, 5 Cir., 257 F. 2d 410, which is not the case here presented, plaintiff is entitled to indemnity under paragraph 12 of the contract, Weyerhaeuser S. S. Co. v. Nacirema Co., 355 U. S. 563, limited only by the modifying provisions of paragraph 14 respecting employees of the parties.

"Under the first clause of paragraph 14, the defendant has agreed to indemnify the plaintiff from the former's act or omission resulting in injury to the employees of either; and in view of the clause immediately following, defendant would not be bound to indemnify plaintiff under the first clause for an act or omission of the plaintiff not joint or concurring with its own act or omission. A consistent reading requires that indemnity under the first clause be predicated upon a sole act or omission of the defendant producing injury, as distinguished from a sole act or omission of the plaintiff, or a joint or concurring act or omission of both. The facts stipulated establish the joint and concurring act or omission of both plaintiff and defendant. Dery v. Wyer, 2 Cir., 265 F. 2d 804, 810, the parties having expressly agreed that in such case each party will assume liability for injury to its own employees and indemnify the other party against such injury. The defendant is bound by its contract to assume liability for the injury to its employee, Will Jackson, and to indemnify plaintiff against such injury. There is no room for the application of any theory of primary and secondary or active and pas-

sive negligence, where, as here, the indemnity is contractual. Weyerhaeuser, supra; Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc., v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U. S. 124."

The district court adjudged that the industry is bound to defend the suit of its employee against the railroad and to hold the railroad harmless.

The industry's principal reliance is upon this Court's decision in **Batson-Cook Co. v. Industrial Steel Erectors**, 5 Cir. 1958, 257 F. 2d 410. In that case we stated the rule in Alabama to be that, "while it need not be done in any particular language or form, unless the intention is unequivocally expressed in the plainest of words, the law will consider that the parties did not undertake to indemnify one against the consequences of his own negligence." 257 F. 2d at 412. No such clear intent was found in **Batson-Cook** because the contract did not contain "the talismanic words 'even though caused, occasioned or contributed to by the negligence, sole or concurrent' of the indemnitee, or like expressions . . . [or] the equivalent clear intent in other language of the agreement." 257 F. 2d at 412. The opinion continued that, "The purpose to impose this extraordinary liability on the indemnitor must be spelled out in unmistakable terms." 257 F. 2d at 413.

The industry devotes the major part of its lengthy brief to a vigorous defense of **Batson-Cook** against criticisms contained in **Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.**, 5 Cir. 1962, 296 F. 2d 256; **Crescent Towing & Salvage Co. v. Dixilyn Drilling Co.**, 5 Cir. 1962, 303 F. 2d 237, reversed in **Dixilyn Drilling Co. v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co.**, 1963, 372 U. S. 697; **Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Wilson**, 5 Cir. 1962, 304 F. 2d 253; and perhaps also in **Republic Steel Corporation v. Payne**, Ala. 1961, 132 So. 2d 581, 585; **U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Mason &**

Dulion, Ala. 1962, 145 So. 2d 711; 713; and **Deen v. Holderfield**, Ala. 1963, 155 So. 2d 314. We do not find it necessary to decide whether **Batson-Cook** is presently a sound holding under the law in Alabama, because we think that, even under the strict test announced in that case, this contract clearly reflects a purpose to indemnify the railroad against consequences contributed to by its own negligence.

The industry admits that it constructed the wooden shed six feet at its closest point from the center line of the spur track and the lumber rack in the immediate vicinity of the track, whereas it had agreed not to put any structure or obstruction, temporary or permanent, within eight feet from the center line of the track. The industry agreed to "indemnify and save harmless the first party (railroad) against and from any and all claims for loss of or damage to property or injury to person caused directly or indirectly by the existence, location or condition of any structures or obstructions of any kind on the premises of second party, or by any structures or obstructions, of either a permanent or temporary nature, on said track, or within the limits of the clearances above provided."

If there were any doubt that "any and all claims" as used in the 12th paragraph include claims contributed to by the negligence of the railroad, that doubt would be removed by the 14th paragraph, certainly insofar as injuries to employees are concerned. To repeat, the 14th paragraph provides, in part, that: ". . . if any claim or liability shall arise from the joint or concurring act or omission of both parties hereto, their employees or agents, each party shall assume all liability for and indemnify the other party against loss, damage or injury to its own employees and to its own property and the property of others in its care or custody, and liability

for loss, damage or injury not herein provided for shall be borne by the parties equally. Provided, that nothing in this section contained is intended to or shall relieve second party of the obligations of release and indemnity contained in Sections 11 and 12."

The contention that the phrase "any claim or liability (arising) from the joint or concurring act or omission of both parties" does not unequivocally include negligent acts or omissions is unfounded. Admittedly, the phrase is broader, for it would include also intentional torts and breaches of contractual duties, such as the industry's breach of its promises in Paragraph 12. But to say that it does not include negligent acts would be to say that use of the word "negligence" is essential. **Batson-Cook** made no such holding, but expressly indicated otherwise—". . . while it need not be done in any particular language . . ." 257 F. 2d at 412. The Supreme Court of Alabama speaking on the related subject of release of a grantor from liability caused by mining operations, was even more explicit:

> "Apparently, the trial court took the position, as do appellees, that since the exculpatory provisions of the deed make no mention of 'negligence,' it was not intended to exonerate Republic from liability for its negligence, particularly in view of the rule that such provisions should be strictly construed against exoneration. Although the word 'negligence' is not used, it seems to us it was clearly intended to release Republic from liability for its negligence. Otherwise, most of the exculpatory provisions, including the covenant not to sue, would be without meaning. It is difficult to see how such provisions could have been more comprehensively drafted to relieve Republic from liability for damages, whatever might be the basis therefor, except, perhaps, by specifically

using the word 'negligence.' But failure to use such word is not alone determinative of the intention of the parties. To say it was intended to relieve Republic only from liability for damages based on a nuisance (cf. Terrell v. Alabama Water Service Co., 245 Ala. 68, 70-71, 15 So. 2d 727), would be to disregard the plain and unambiguous wording of those provisions exonerating Republic 'from **any** and **all** claims for damages and **all** liability by reason of damages either to persons or property which may **in any way** be caused or occasioned at any time,' and the covenant not to sue."

Republic Steel Corporation v. Payne, Ala. 1961, 132 So. 2d 581, 585, 586.

Moreover, the final proviso in Paragraph 14 is a clear recognition by the parties that the industry's obligation of indemnity contained in Paragraph 12 is broader than its promises in Paragraph 14, and covers other claims or liabilities as well. We conclude that the industry's indemnity embraced claims based on the railroad's negligence.[2]

It had seemed to us that if the contract to indemnify the railroad does not embrace claims based on the railroad's negligence it had no meaning. In a supplemental brief, appellant's able counsel sought to refute that view.[3]

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[2] Accord: Eureka Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., Ala., 1929, 122 So. 169; Booher-Kelly Lumber Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 9 Cir. 1950, 183 F. 2d 902; Seaboldt v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3 Cir., 1961, 290 F. 2d 296, on second appeal, 1963, 317 F. 2d 363, cert. denied under name Thompson Mahogany Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1963, 375 U. S. 907.

[3] In substance as follows:

"At the argument of this appeal, counsel for the appellant was requested to suggest to the Court a field of operation for the hold harmless agreement relied upon by the Railroad if the appellee is not to be indemnified thereunder for loss or liability arising out of its own negligent conduct. In this connection, we submit that in

While the resourcefulness of counsel is admirable, their refutation appears to us strained and our view remains unchanged insofar as concerns any field of operation of the contract which would ordinarily be in the minds of the parties.

The industry did not plead as an affirmative defense that the indemnity agreement is an illegal contract, but it does urge that the public policy of the State does not permit a construction which would indemnify a common carrier for its own negligent conduct. As noted, however, in a valuable annotation in 175 A. L. R., at p. 102, ". . . the service afforded the shipper by such additional facilities for the special handling of his freight is not required of the railroad under its duties to the public as a carrier, so that it may attach such conditions as it sees fit in giving its consent to furnish the particular service, including a provision for exemption from liability for loss through its own negligence." Accord as to contract indemnifying

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Alabama under the authority of *Mallory Steamship Company v. Druhan*, 17 Ala. App. 365, 84 So. 874 [877], 'where both parties are at fault, but the fault of the party from whom indemnity is claimed was the efficient cause of the injury,' indemnity is recoverable. See also *City of Mobile v. George*, 253 Ala. 591, 45 So. 2d 778, to the effect that one held liable to an injured person because of his passive negligence has rights of indemnity over against another who was not sued by the injured party, but who was guilty of active negligence. . . .

"We further suggest that the sidetrack agreement could effectively provide indemnity to the Railroad for loss and expense incurred by it in the investigation and defense of an action arising out of some alleged wrong claimed to have been committed by it involving the tracks on the premises of the appellant industry, but where it is adjudicated that the Railroad is free of fault on account of its lack of negligence. . . .

". . . We submit that the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company in its use of the sidetrack on the premises of Miller & Company of Birmingham, Inc., could incur a liability under the F. E. L. A. to one of its own employees thereupon injured by reason of its unsafe condition, and despite the absence of active negligence on the part of the railroad in creating the danger. The appellee could look to the industry, however, for indemnity on account of its breach of this non-delegable duty. . . ."

railroad against injuries by operation of light and power line. **Eureka Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.**, Ala. 1929, 122 So. 169; see also, 6A Corbin on Contracts, § 1471, p. 589.

The stipulated facts do not connect the railroad's negligence with its duties as a common carrier, or even show that the railroad is a common carrier, though we take judicial notice that it is.[4] Here, however, the railroad was contracting for a service not required of it as a common carrier. See **Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Davenport**, 5 Cir. 1953, 205 F. 2d 589, 594, 595.

It makes no difference that an Alabama Statute[5] may impose a duty on the railroad to construct and maintain spur tracks to existing industries. The Alabama Public Service Commission has adopted no general rules to implement that statute, nor has it prohibited the kind of indemnity contract here agreed on. In **Sunlight Carbon Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co.**, 8 Cir. 1926, 15 F. 2d 802; 805, it was said: ". . . on principle we perceive no reason why a railroad company may not, when acting in its private capacity, relieve itself from an absolute liability imposed by statute as well as from liability resulting from negligence." The spur track in this case was constructed and maintained not under the mandate of this statute but pursuant to the agreement between the industry and the railroad.

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[4] Section 242 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 provides in part:

"All railroads and canals not constructed and used exclusively for private purposes, shall be public highways, and all railroad and canal companies shall be common carriers."

[5] "§ 205. *Spur and sidetracks provided for.*—Every railroad is required to construct and maintain spur tracks and side tracks to industries already established under such reasonable rules and orders as may be made by the commission." Title 48, §205 of the 1940 Code of Alabama.

In the main, we agree with the district court's construction of the indemnity agreement. We disagree, however, with its judgment that the industry is bound and obligated to defend the suit of its employee against the railroad. The industry has the option to take its chances and await the possible event of the liability of the railroad becoming fixed and ascertained. **King v. Capitol Amusement Co.**, Ala. 1930, 130 So. 799. However, after notice and an opportunity to defend, any judgment against the railroad will be conclusive against the indemnitor industry, unless obtained by fraud or collusion.[6] Further, in the event of judgment against the railroad, the agreement to "hold harmless" includes the costs of defending the claim. See 19 Words and Phrases, Perm. ed., p. 570 and pocket supplement.

The judgment is therefore modified so as to eliminate the provision that the industry is bound and obligated to defend the suit of its employee against the railroad. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. Costs of appeal are taxed against the appellant.

Modified and Affirmed.

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[6] King v. Capitol Amusement Co., supra; 27 Am. Jur. Indemnity, §§ 34 and 35; p. 478; 42 C. J. S., Indemnity, § 32a, pp. 613-615

APPENDIX "B."

Applicable Section From Constitution and Statutes.

Article 12, Section 242, Alabama Constitution of 1901:

"Sec. **242.** All railroads and canals not constructed and used exclusively for private purposes, shall be public highways, and all railroad and canal companies shall be common carriers. Any association or corporation organized for the purpose shall have the right to construct and operate a railway between any points in this state, and connect at the state line, with railroads of other states. Every railroad company shall have the right with its road to intersect, connect with, or cross any other railroad, and each shall receive and transport the freight, passengers, and cars, loaded or empty, of the others, without delay or discrimination."

Title 48, Section 170, Alabama Code, 1940, as Recompiled:

"§ **170.** (9952) (5473) (3440) (1144) (1699) (1399) **Duty of engineer as to ringing bell and blowing whistle.**—The engineer or other person having control of the running of a locomotive on any railroad, must blow the whistle or ring the bell at least one-fourth of a mile before reaching any public road crossing, or any regular station or stopping place on such railroad, and continue to blow the whistle or ring the bell at short intervals, until it has passed such crossing, or reached such station or stopping place. He must also blow the whistle or ring the bell immediately before and at the time of leaving such station or stopping place; and also immediately before entering any curve crossed by a public road, where he cannot see at least one-fourth of a mile ahead, and must approach and pass such crossing at such speed as to prevent accident in the event of an obstruction at the crossing. He must

also blow the whistle or ring the bell at short intervals, on entering into, or while moving within or passing through any village, town, or city. He must also, on perceiving any obstruction on the track, use all the means within his power, known to skillful engineers, such as applying brakes and reversing engine, in order to stop the train."

Title 48, Section 173, Alabama Code, 1940, as Recompiled:

"§ **173.** (9955) (5476) (3443) (1147) (1722) (1401) **Railroad liable for injuries; burden of proof.**—A railroad company is liable for all damages done to persons, or to stock or other property, resulting from a failure to comply with the requirements of the three preceding sections, or any negligence on the part of such company or its agents, and when any person or stock is killed or injured, or other property destroyed or damaged by the locomotive or cars of any railroad, the burden of proof, in any suit brought therefor, is on the railroad company to show a compliance with the requirements of such sections, and that there was no negligence on the part of the company or its agents."

Title 48, Section 205, Alabama Code, 1940, as Recompiled:

"§ **205.** (10041) (5544) **Spur and sidetracks provided for.**—Every railroad is required to construct and maintain spur tracks and sidetracks to industries already established under such reasonable rules and orders as may be made by the commission."

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1963

No. 1047

MILLER AND COMPANY OF BIRMINGHAM, INC., - - - - - - - - - Petitioner,

vs.

LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, - - - - - - - - Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1963

No. 1047

MILLER AND COMPANY OF BIRMINGHAM, INC., - - - - - - - - - - *Petitioner,*

v.

LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, - - - - - - *Respondent.*

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT.

A writ of certiorari should not be granted in this case for five distinct reasons:

(1) The affirmative defense of illegality, upon which the Petitioner's "questions presented" depend, was not raised below.

(2) The Petitioner depends on a strained interpretation of one Alabama statute (Title 48, §205 Code of 1940 Recompiled) for the expression of "public policy" which allegedly voids an otherwise valid contract. The record below does not contain any evidence that the Petitioner was an industry "already established" within the meaning of that Alabama statute.

(3) Another assumption basic to the Petitioner's argument is that the Respondent was acting as a "common carrier" when it executed the contract which the Petitioner seeks to avoid. The record is completely without evidence to support this assumption.

(4) Petitioner asserts that the decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with the "settled law" of the forum (Alabama); but, on the contrary, it fully comports with the decisions of that state and with the decisions of other forums.

(5) In its brief, Petitioner seeks to apply the reasoning of a line of admiralty cases which is limited to a strict set of facts and which does not apply in cases such as this one.

ARGUMENT.

I.

The Affirmative Defense of Illegality Was Not Raised in the District Court.

It is, of course, axiomatic that this Court will not grant a writ of certiorari to review a question which is not presented by the record in the case. *Tyrrell* v. *District of Columbia*, 243 U. S. 1 (1916). The instant case originated in the Northern District of Alabama as a declaratory judgment suit seeking the interpretation and enforcement of two indemnity provisions contained in a contract between the Petitioner and the Respondent. The case was presented to the District Court on an agreed stipulation of facts. The Petitioner argued in the District Court that the provisions in the

contract should not be construed to require indemnity by Petitioner for loss occasioned by the negligence of the Respondent. The District Court held that the indemnity provisions require the Petitioner to indemnify the Respondent for any loss which it might suffer as a result of the specific personal injury suit referred to in the complaint, namely, a suit filed by one Will Jackson which was pending against the Respondent in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama.

The claim that the indemnity provisions of the contract between the Respondent and the Petitioner are illegal as being against public policy is an affirmative defense. Such a defense must be raised by the defendant's answer in the District Court. *Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc. 8(c).* The defense of illegality was not raised in the Petitioner's answer (R. 13-14). In its answer, the Petitioner admitted the existence of the justiciable controversy alleged in the complaint (R. 14), to-wit, "whether the defendant is obligated by virtue of [the indemnity provisions] to defend the suit filed by Will Jackson and indemnify and hold harmless the plaintiff in respect to said suit" (R. 7).

The case then came on for pretrial hearing and the District Court entered a pretrial order in which it listed "all of the issues in controversy" (R. 14). The contentions of the Petitioner were set out in the following paragraph of that order:

> "The defendant concedes that there is a justiciable controversy but denies that the plaintiff is entitled to any relief. It contends specifically that the indemnity agreement does not indemnify the

plaintiff against its own negligent act which it avers is the gravamen of the complaint filed by Jackson against the plaintiff" (R. 15).

The District Court concluded its pretrial order in normal fashion:

> "It is therefore ordered by the court that all of the above-named allowances and agreements be and the same are hereby binding upon all parties in the above styled cause, unless this order be hereafter modified by order of the court" (R. 16).

The order was never modified and no request for such a modification was made. There was no mention of the Petitioner's present contention that the contract was illegal because it contravened public policy.

The District Court found that the Respondent was entitled to indemnity under provisions of the contract and entered its judgment accordingly (R. 24-29). The Petitioner moved for a new trial but did not assign as a ground therefor that the contract was void as against public policy (R. 30). The motion was overruled (R. 31) and an appeal was taken by Petitioner to the Court of Appeals (R. 32-35). In its appellate brief, the Petitioner raised for the first time the question that the indemnity provisions were illegal as being against public policy.

In short, the defense is an afterthought of counsel. It was not raised in the District Court and is, therefore, waived. *Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(h).*

Petitioner now seeks to require the Respondent to defend against this bald assertion of illegality, which

is unsupported by any evidence, without the opportunity of offering evidence in rebuttal. "The burden of showing illegality is upon the party asserting it and it is not sufficient merely to create confusion and suggest doubts as to its legality." *United States* v. *Grace Evangelical Church*, 132 F. 2d 460, 462 (7th Cir. 1943). Please see also *Palmer* v. *Chamberlin*, 191 F. 2d 532, 539 (5th Cir. 1951); *Adams-Mitchell Co.* v. *Cambridge Distributing Co.*, 189 F. 2d 913 (2nd Cir. 1951); *Reid* v. *Edwards*, 7 Porter 508 (Ala. 1838). The defense must be pleaded and proved in the District Court. In *Brown* v. *Warner*, 173 F. 2d 162 (5th Cir. 1949), the appellant urged for the first time on appeal that a note sued upon was unenforceable and void because it had been given for stock in a corporation formed for the purpose of manufacturing gambling devices. The court disposed of this "appellate" defense in one sentence:

> "We agree with appellee that the defense of illegality unsupported as it is by either pleadings or proof, was not made out below, and may not be urged here." 173 F. 2d at 164.

A similar result has been reached in numerous other cases. Please see, *e.g.*, *Charm-Tred Mills, Inc.* v. *Erle P. Halliburton, Inc.*, 202 F. 2d 294, 297 (7th Cir. 1953); *C. B. Snyder Realty Co.* v. *Sherrill-Noonan, Inc.*, 261 F. 2d 269, 272 (3rd Cir. 1958); *Beechwood Lumber Co.* v. *Tobin*, 199 F. 2d 878, 881 (5th Cir. 1952); *City of Orange* v. *Fidelity & Deposit Co.*, 180 F. 2d 369, 370

(5th Cir. 1950); *McElhaney* v. *Singleton*, 270 Ala. 162, 169, 117 So. 2d 375, 382 (1960).

We respectfully submit that able counsel for the Petitioner did not raise the defense of illegality by the pleading or evidence below and that, therefore, the "questions" raised in their brief are not truly "presented" for the Court's consideration.

II.

The Evidence Does Not Establish That the Statute Upon Which Petitioner's Argument Depends Is Applicable in This Case.

Petitioner relies on Title 48, Section 205, Alabama Code of 1940 (Recompiled 1959) as the basis for the expression of public policy which the indemnity provisions of the contract allegedly violate. That very brief statute reads as follows:

> "§205. Spur and sidetracks provided for.—Every railroad is required to construct and maintain spur tracks and sidetracks to industries *already established* under such reasonable rules and orders as may be made by the commission" [Alabama Public Service Commission]. (Emphasis added.)

Nowhere in the record is there any evidence that the Petitioner was an industry "already established" within the meaning of the statute. For aught that appears the Petitioner was an industry which was established long after the railroad and was thus in a position to pick its location and to bargain freely with

Respondent and the other railroads in the area with respect to the terms and conditions upon which rail service would be provided.

Without discussing the intent and history of the foregoing statute, it is sufficient to say that no judicial decision has given it the effect sought by the Petitioner, nor has the "Alabama Public Service Commission adopted any general rules to implement the statute, or prohibited the kind of indemnity contract before the Court" (opinion below 328 F. 2d at 78). Thus, the Petitioner seeks to have this Court adopt a strained and totally new construction of a state statute *upon a record which does not contain facts that establish the applicability of the statute.*

III.

There Are No Facts Contained in the Record Which Establish That the Respondent Was Acting as a Common Carrier in the Execution of the Contract Containing the Indemnity Provisions.

Another fallacious assumption upon which the Petitioner is relying is that the Respondent was acting as a common carrier in the execution of the contract containing the indemnity provisions. If the Respondent was not acting as a common carrier, then all of the authorities cited by Petitioner are inapposite.

The Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the fact that the Respondent was a common carrier but concluded that it was "contracting for a service not required of it as a common carrier." 328 F. 2d at 78.

Certainly the Respondent is not acting as a common carrier when it sells, leases and purchases land, nor when it operates a commissary or contracts for the purchase of supplies, etc. There is *no evidence* in the record which establishes that the Respondent was engaged in the activities of a common carrier. In fact, the inference therefrom is that it was not so engaged when it executed the contract in question. Please see *McKinney* v. *Mobile & O. R. Co.*, 215 Ala. 101, 102, 109 So. 752, 753 (1926); *United States* v. *Grace Evangelical Church, supra*, 132 F. 2d 460 at 462. The paucity of the evidence in the record about the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract containing the indemnity provisions merely shows that the sole issue before the court below was the interpretation of these provisions and not their legality *vel non*.

A writ of certiorari should not be granted to review a case where there is no evi lentiary basis in the record to support the existence of the "questions presented" by the Petitioner.

IV.

The Decision Below Was Correct and Was in Accord With the Law of Alabama and Other Jurisdictions.

Petitioner recklessly asserts that the decision below conflicts with the settled law of Alabama. The four cases cited to support this proposition all involve attempts by a railroad to *extinguish* a liability, not to receive *indemnification* for a liability. There has been no attempt by the Respondent to avoid any liability

which it might owe to Will Jackson, the injured party, who filed a personal-injury suit against the Respondent. The Respondent seeks indemnity from the Petitioner for its potential liability to Jackson, the basis for such indemnity being a contract willingly entered into by Petitioner.

The case of *Gulf, M. & O. R. Co.* v. *Scott*, 32 Ala. App. 326, 27 So. 2d 150 (1946), cited by Petitioner, held that a railroad could not contract to escape *liability* for negligently killing livestock. The basis for this decision is the case of *Central of Ga. Ry. Co.* v. *Hammond*, 210 Ala. 687, 99 So. 74 (1924). That decision points out that Alabama had an "open range" policy and statutory provisions shifting the burden of proof to the railroad to prove that the killing of livestock was not due to its negligence. Thus, the court held that the contract "is void to the extent it attempts to absolve defendant from liability for the consequences of neglect of its statutory duty in the operation of its trains." 210 Ala. at 688, 99 So. at 75. Neither that decision nor the *Scott* case hold that the railroad could not contract for indemnification against such liability; they only hold that a railroad cannot *extinguish* a statutory liability.

The case of *Hissong* v. *Richmond & Danville Rr. Co.*, 91 Ala. 514, 8 So. 776 (1890), involved an employment contract of a railroad employee whereby the railroad sought to escape liability for injuries to the employee. This contract was against the explicit public policy of the State as expressed by the then-applicable

Alabama Employer's Liability Act. Obviously, the case has no bearing on the present situation.

Steele & Burgess v. *Townsend*, 37 Ala. 247 (1861), and *Alabama Great So. RR. Co.* v. *Thomas & Sons*, 83 Ala. 343, 3 So. 802 (1887), also cited by the Petitioner, involved cases wherein, again, a railroad attempted, not to gain indemnity, but to escape liability for negligently handling freight. The *Steele* decision indicates that a carrier may limit its liability for negligence with a shipper by means of a special contract; but regardless of this, it is evident that the two cases cast no light upon the validity of the indemnity contract involved in this case.

The annotation appearing at 175 A.L.R., p. 102, provides numerous examples of decisions wherein indemnity contracts between railroads and industries were upheld. *Eureka Coal Co.* v. *L & N Railroad Co.*, 219 Ala. 286, 122 So. 169 (1929), *Alabama Great So. RR. Co.* v. *Demoville*, 167 Ala. 292, 52 So. 406 (1910) (specifically rejecting public policy defense), *McKinney* v. *M. & O. R. R. Co.*, 215 Ala. 101, 109 So. 752 (1926) (pointing out that railroad is not acting in capacity of common carrier and rejecting public policy defense), and *Southern R. R. Co.* v. *Blunt & Ward*, 165 F. 258 (5th Cir. 1908), all provide examples of the validity under Alabama law of contracts whereby a railroad was indemnified against loss caused by its own negligence. For other examples of the enforcement of similar contracts, please see *Jacksonville Terminal Co.* v. *Railway Express Agency, Inc.*, 296 F. 2d 256 (5th Cir. 1961), *Booth-Kelley Lumber Co.* v. *Southern*

Pacific Co., 183 F. 2d 902 (9th Cir. 1950), *Buckeye Cotton Oil Co.* v. *Louisville & N. R. R. Co.*, 24 F. 2d 347 (6th Cir. 1928), *Watkins* v. *Baltimore & O. R. Co.*, 29 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1939); *Deep Vein Coal Co.* v. *Chicago & E. I. Ry. Co.*, 71 F. 2d 963 (7th Cir. 1934), *Gollick* v. *New York Cen. R. R. Co.*, 138 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Mich. 1956); *Pennsylvania R. R. Co.* v. *Erie Ave. Warehouse*, 193 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1960), *John P. Gorman Coal Co.* v. *Louisville & N. R. R. Co.*, 213 Ky. 551, 281 S. W. 487 (1926) (public policy defense specifically rejected), and *Luton Mining Co.* v. *Louisville & N. R. R. Co.*, 276 Ky. 321, 123 S. W. 2d 1055 (1938) (public policy defense specifically rejected).

In view of the above cited authorities, it is apparent that the decision of the court below merely follows a long line of similar decisions and that there is no conflict of authority presented for this Court to resolve.

V.

The Rationale of the *Bisso* Decision Is Not Applicable to This Case.

In *Bisso* v. *Inland Waterways Corp.*, 349 U. S. 85 (1955), the owner of a barge sued the owner of a towboat for negligently damaging the barge while it was being towed by the defendant. The towboat owner attempted to *extinguish his liability* (not require indemnification) by pleading the exculpatory provisions of the towage contract. This Court held that the contract was void as against public policy.

Petitioner can gain no comfort from the rule of this decision. Its application has been limited to the unique factual situation which was before the Court and has not been applied even in other closely related admiralty situations. For example, the validity of contracts relieving a maritime pilot from liability for his negligence has been upheld. See *Sun Oil Co.* v. *Dalzell Towing Co.*, 287 U. S. 291 (1932), approved in *Bisso*.

A specific exception to *Bisso* was created in *Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co., Inc.* v. *River Terminals Corp.*, 360 U. S. 411 (1959). That case involved the same limited factual situation as *Bisso*, but the exculpatory clause contained in the contract was also contained in the towage company's tariff which was on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission. This Court held that the exculpatory clause was not void as a matter of law and that the Court should pass on the legality of the contract only after the I.C.C. had done so.

The rule of *Bisso* has not been applied to carriers by rail, but if it were, it would not be applicable to the present factual situation. It might apply, by analogy, to a situation in which a railroad sought to extinguish any possible liability it might have to a shipper for the transportation of its freight. Even then it would appear that the *Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co.* exception would apply because of the "pervasive regulatory scheme" (360 U. S. at 418) established by the I.C.C. and the various state Public Service Commissions.

CONCLUSION.

In closing, we think it appropriate to quote from *Richardson* v. *Mellish*, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. (Full Reprint) 294, 303 (1824), wherein Burrough, Judge, said:

> "'I, for one, protest, as my lord has done against arguing too strongly upon public policy;—it is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all but when other points fail."

The Respondent respectfully submits that the case was tried below on the question of interpretation of the indemnity provisions and not on their validity. The issue of the validity of the provisions is not properly before this Court. The decision of the Court of Appeals is correct in all respects and does not conflict with the law of Alabama or of other jurisdictions. The writ should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

JAMES A. SIMPSON,
Attorney for Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.

I, James A. Simpson, attorney for Respondent and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that on the 21st day of May, 1964, a true copy of the foregoing Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari has been served upon Mr. James E. Clark, City Federal Building, Birmingham, Alabama, attorney of record for Miller and Company of Birmingham, Inc., by depositing the same in a United States mail box, with first class postage prepaid, addressed to said attorney at said address.

Attorney for Respondent.